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The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) adopting on earning management by considering the role of board size and board independence. 
Univariate tests and multivariate regression analysis were employed to test whether the level of 
earnings management is significantly lower after the adoption of IFRS and whether the role of board 
size and board independence on constraining the earnings managements is higher after IFRS adoption 
for a sample of Chinese listed companies during the period 2003 to 2013 except 2007 over a four-year 
period before and a six-year period after the adoption of IFRS. The empirical results show that earning 
management increased after the adoption of IFRS. However, there is no relationship between board size 
and earnings management before and after the adoption of IFRS but board independence has 
significantly decreased the earning management after the adoption of IFRS in China. The findings of 
this study have important implications for policymakers, auditors, multinational firms, and users of 
financial reports. As the rapid growth of China's economy gains global recognition, the Chinese stock 
market is capturing the attention of international investor. 
 
Key words: Earning management, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), board size, board 
independence. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
East Asia, Europe, and the US have experienced 
financial scandals that have decreased the confidence of 
investors in the integrity of accounting information. This 
loss in confidence has drawn attention to compliance 
issues with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards   (IFRS)     and     corporate     governance    in 
developing countries and emerging markets. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is 
devoted to developing a single set of high-quality global 
accounting standards which requires comparable and 
transparent information in the overall function of financial 
statements (www.iasb.org).  As  a result, it developed the
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IFRS to achieve the goals of enhancing the characteristics 
and the quality of financial reporting. 
According to Verriest et al. (2013) and Pelucio-Greccoa 
et al. (2014), regulators argue that although firms adopt 
IFRS to improve the quality of accounting information, the 
IFRS also decreases earnings management. In February 
2006, the Chinese Ministry of Finance issued new 
accounting standards that integrated the IFRS with few 
exceptions. The new standards required all the traded 
firms on the stock exchanges of Shenzhen and Shanghai 
to implement the new standards of accounting starting in 
January 2007. Further, the Code of Corporate 
Governance (CCG) for the listed firms was adopted in 
China in 2002.  
Although China intended to adopt the IFRS to promote 
comparability with international accounting practices, 
whether such objectives are achievable is not clear. The 
incentives of Chinese listed firms to manage earnings are 
particularly strong, and the business environment may be 
a mismatch for the IFRS. Nevertheless, Chinese financial 
accounting has a powerful role. Numerous securities 
regulations are involved; in particular earnings targets 
which offer strong incentives to manage the earnings of 
Chinese listed firms. For instance, if a firm experiences 
accounting losses in three successive years, it will be 
delisted. Furthermore, before the firms can issue more 
shares, they need to meet certain profitability targets, like 
for the return on assets. Ball et al. (2003) highlight that it 
is important for a firm to report its incentives in order to 
shape the observed quality of financial reporting. Further, 
the earnings management due to these incentives are 
unlikely to change after IFRS adoption. Despite the IFRS 
inducing more earnings quality in countries with well 
aligned financial reporting incentives, opportunities to 
manage Chinese firms’ earnings can be presented 
through more principle-based standards.  
Also, China generally has weak external monitoring, 
regulatory enforcement, and investor protection. 
According to Hail et al. (2010), without the availability of 
corporate governance and strong investor protection, 
managers and insiders may misuse the increased 
judgement that is required by more principle-based 
accounting standards in order to achieve private control 
benefits. In addition, the flexibility of earnings 
management increases with the availability of strong 
incentives. Therefore, the Chinese accounting profession 
is still developing. Particularly, medium and small-sized 
firms experience enormous variation in skill levels and in 
the professional competence of corporate auditors and 
accountants. 
Finally, the reliability of financial reporting would be 
reduced through the subjective assessment and internal 
valuation that are part of the implementation of a fair 
value measurement. The reasoning is that China does 
not have any valuation arising from “arms-length” 
transactions in any active market. Next to the US, China 
was globally ranked as the second largest in terms of  the  
 
 
 
 
market value of publicly traded shares in 2007 as a result 
of the IFRS impact on Chinese earnings management. 
Leuz et al. (2010) indicate that China is the largest and 
fastest growing emerging market and has increasingly 
become important to global investors. This study aims to 
extend the research in the earnings management 
literature to an emerging country by examining the IFRS 
as a new regulatory framework in addition to discovering 
the functions of the board’s size and independence on 
constraining earnings management. Precisely, this study 
seeks to discover the effects of the board’s independence 
and size on earnings managements pre- and post-IFRS. 
This study is similar to Miko (2016) who examine the 
moderating institutional ownership role on the relation 
among some audit committee features and earnings 
management, and to Marra et al. (2011) who discover the 
moderating role of IFRS adoption on the relationship 
between earnings management and board monitoring.  
The contribution of this study to the literature is that it 
evaluates whether the compulsory implementation of 
IFRS has reduced earnings management as well as 
whether board size and the board of directors have a 
greater impact on constraining earnings management 
after this implementation in China after 2007. It advances 
the comparative international accounting literature by 
studying whether the standards of intercontinental 
accounting indicate the acceptable benefits to the 
regulated markets which not speak English. The 
evidence shows that there is lower earnings management 
in general. Because the Chinese economy has a 
dissimilar institutional context from other regulated 
developing countries, this study is not only enlightening 
for accounting regulators but also for the international 
accounting standard setters which experience the same 
issues as in China.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
There are numerous studies on IFRS adoption and its 
effect on earnings management. This study extends and 
supplements the literature on the adoption of IFRS by 
examining the effects of the board’s independence and 
size on earnings management before and after adoption 
in a regulated market under rapid change in a main 
developing country. 
 
 
IFRS adoption 
 
The literature finds that reporting quality is different 
among nations with different levels of investor protection. 
Even if the adoption of the IFRS reduces the differences, 
earnings management remains different across nations. 
Principally, the reasons are the divergences in culture, 
legal  structure,  and  practices. These  differences  result  
 
 
 
 
from various levels of interpretation and compliance 
because of less comparability in financial statements. 
Past studies have proposed that the accounting quality is 
higher in strong enforcement nations as compared to 
weak one (Ali et al., 2017). Other studies   e a and 
Franco, 2017) have stated diverse problems, such as the 
responses to IFRS adoption, impacts of adoption on the 
expense of fairness, value of accounting evidence, 
comparability or financial functions, impacts of pre- and 
post-IFRS adoption on the rate of adoption, integration 
and process of IFRS implementation, the cultural impact 
on the implementation process of IFRS.  However, the 
anticipated benefits of IFRS adoption are far away 
because of the insufficient quality of financial reporting. 
As countries have different regulatory, political or 
institutional settings, this dimension is potentially relevant 
for understanding variation in levels of disclosure 
compliance and drivers of compliance. A large number 
gather studies dealing with the adoption of and 
compliance with IFRS in China (Gao and Kling, 2012; 
Peng et al., 2008). 
IFRS convergence in China has been driven by the 
Chinese government to facilitate its “Open Door” policy 
and by the rapid growth of the Chinese stock market. 
One of the most distinguishing features of IFRS 
implementation in China is the strong leadership provided 
by the Chinese Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Qu et al., 
2012). China’s national standards have been 
substantially converged with IFRS, and China has 
committed to the adoption of IFRS for reporting by at 
least some domestic companies, although there is no 
timetable for the completion of the process. He et al. 
(2012) examine Chinese firms that adopt IFRS in 2007 
and examine the effect of the fair value provisions under 
IFRS. They found that IFRS results in increased earnings 
manipulation among Chinese firms with large portfolios of 
trading securities and debt restructuring. 
According to Defond et al. (2016), local firms from 
developing nations may experience problems with IFRS 
adoption; for instance, less opportunity to impact the 
international accounting standard process, cost of 
merging may be higher than the expected benefits, and 
the lack of representational faithfulness. 
Earlier studies show mixed results regarding the 
relation between earnings management and IFRS 
adoption. For instance, Barth et al. (2012) show the 
superiority of the IFRS in limiting managerial discretion. 
On the other hand, some studies found that IFRS offers 
additional flexibility to managers to manipulate 
accounting numbers (Rudra and Bhattacharjee, 2012; 
Ahmed et al., 2013; JeanJean and Stolowy, 2008). 
Nevertheless, each country experiences different impacts 
from these standards. 
For instance, Bajra and Cadez (2018) use a sample of 
European firms to examine how the central mechanism of 
governance affects earnings management. They use 
comprehensive  methods  of  measurements  to  evaluate  
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the qualities of the board of directors and the internal 
audit and found that the two mechanisms negatively 
affect the management of earnings but have a positive 
interactive effect. Nevertheless, Lam et al. (2019) point 
out that IFRS adoption increases earnings management, 
and the cumulative outcome is more noticeable in low 
trust countries. Similarly, DeFond et al. (2019) indicate 
that IFRS convergence leads to a favourable Chinese 
stock market, and this impact is more distinct in firms with 
a larger dependence on external capital. 
 
 
Adoption of IFRS and earnings management 
 
Previous studies by Bakker (2017) on the influence of 
IFRS adoption on earnings management have 
inconsistencies. Universally, the research by DeFond et 
al. (2014) found a positive impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting quality. However, according to McEwen 
(2014), the IFRS is expected to advance the market 
infrastructure, minimise the cost of processing 
information, improve reporting quality as well as attract 
foreign investments. According to George et al. (2017), a 
IFRS statement discloses earnings management in terms 
of income smoothing and loss avoidance better than the 
local GAAP. Research by Ding et al. (2018) shows that 
the IFRS adoption assists in minimising the complexity 
and in developing the transparency of financial reporting 
in Hong Kong. However, research by Zealand and 
Zealandb (2015) demonstrates that cross-country 
variances in accounting quality will continue following 
IFRS adoption. The reason is because the accounting 
quality is a function of the firm’s general institutional 
structure that reflects the political and legal structures of 
the nation in which the firm resides. 
Some studies have looked at IFRS adoption in the UK 
and have found that the introduction of the IFRS has 
improved the value of relevant accounting figures and 
decreased the level of earnings management (Iatridis and 
Rouvolis, 2010). By contrast, some studies indicate that 
after IFRS adoption in France, there has been a noted 
increase in the pervasiveness of earnings management. 
These different findings across countries show the 
significant role of national institutional factors in framing 
the characteristics of financial reporting (JeanJean and 
Stolowy, 2008). Moreover, Zhou et al. (2009) studied a 
sample of Chinese firms and observed how the adoption 
of IFRS affects earnings management. The difference 
between earlier Chinese standards and the IFRS is that 
the latter is principle-based while the former is rule-
based. Additionally, the post-adoption earnings are less 
smooth, which is consistent with a reduction in earnings 
management. Zhou et al. (2009) point out that the 
improvements of IFRS adoption are, to some extent, 
neutralised by additional opportunities to manage 
earnings.  
The  results  of  studies  which  use  a   unique   sample 
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cannot be generalised to other countries (Barth et al., 
2008). Subsequently, Barth et al. (2008) create a sample 
of 1,896 firm-year observations for 327 firms in 21 
countries which adopted the IAS for the first time 
between 1994 and 2003. They research how the IAS 
adoption affects the level of earnings management. The 
results show that the IAS adoption decreases the level of 
earnings management (Barth et al., 2008). Accordingly, 
the research findings claim that the IFRS allows 
additional flexibility to managers. Some studies found that 
the IFRS is descriptive in nature and allows the choice 
between some substitute actions.  
In the current literature, the findings for earnings 
management are mixed. The first hypothesis has been 
developed based on previous research as follows: 
 
H1: The level of earnings management is lower after the 
adoption of IFRS in China. 
 
 
The role of board characteristics on constraining 
earnings management 
 
There are two reasons that motivate the board of 
directors to use their monitoring actions to decrease 
earnings managements. The first reason is to stop 
managers from using their power over earnings 
management against the interests of shareholders. The 
second reason is to prevent controlling shareholders from 
undermining resources for their benefit against the 
interests of minority shareholders. Accordingly, the board 
of directors can enforce effective constraints on earnings 
management.  
In addition, previous studies indicate that managers 
could manipulate earnings to mislead shareholders which 
then become a possible agency cost. Furthermore, the 
board of directors can play a significant role in 
constraining earnings managements through effective 
monitoring that maintains the credibility of the financial 
reports. As well, some studies show evidence of the 
importance of the board’s role in monitoring financial 
reporting and preventing the manipulation of accounting 
information. 
The effectiveness of board governance is affected by 
the number of board members. Despite the fact that 
some studies have mixed results on the relation between 
board size and earnings management, numerous 
empirical studies confirm the existence of such a relation. 
Nevertheless, there are less empirical studies on the 
effect of board size on earnings management than those 
after IFRS adoption. Based on the organisation and 
agency behaviour theories, some researchers point out 
that having a big board of directors is not always the best 
option. Controlling and legalising strategic decisions as 
well as preventing the manipulation of financial 
information are indication of a protective board of 
directors. The board’s objectivity on the  firm  helps  them  
 
 
 
 
to monitor it but their excellent skills and expertise also 
help. Numerous studies including Verriest et al. (2013) 
and Xie et al. (2003) emphasise that the only way to 
minimise the risk for a firm is through involving more 
directors who will, in turn, bring more external resources, 
involvement as well as the knowledge on decreasing 
earnings management. Moreover, the interests of various 
stakeholders on the board can be easily organised by 
different representatives of stakeholders. Wang and Xiao 
(2011) is one of earlier Chinese studies to point out that 
board size and earnings management normally have a 
negative relation.  
Following the previous discussion, this study assumes 
that board size will constrain earnings management after 
IFRS adoption. 
 
H2: The role of board size on constraining earnings 
management is higher after IFRS adoption. 
 
Based on the agency viewpoint of earnings management 
and board independence, the ability of the board to 
perform successful monitoring depends on its 
independence from management. Moreover, many 
empirical studies have shown independent directors’ 
effect on earnings management through monitoring. 
Further, the existence of independent directors 
decreases the probability of fraud in a financial statement 
(Beasley, 1996). The control of earnings management in 
addition to the financial accounting can only be effective 
by having more boards which are independent from the 
CEO. Other studies specify that earnings management is 
not likely to occur in firms with boards that include more 
independent outside directors (Xie et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, studies claim that independent directors of 
listed firms in China play a significant role because of a 
higher percentage on the board lowers earnings 
management (Zhang and Chen, 2006). On the other 
hand, Cai et al. (2008) illustrate that earnings 
management has no substantial relationship with 
independent directors. Using 2002 to 2004 data obtained 
from listed firms, Wang (2006) observes the relationship 
between earnings quality and independent directors. The 
result of the study is that there is no significant role of 
independent directors in China. According to Cumming et 
al. (2016), financial reporting problems include high levels 
of technical information and therefore, a great magnitude 
of earnings management. According to the study by 
Xiong and Ganguli (2014), the restriction on earnings 
management involves the independent directors. 
However, Osma (2017) argues that independent directors 
as members of the audit committee minimise earnings 
management by wisely monitoring supervisory decision-
making. Therefore, self-governing directors have 
incentives to earnings management.  
 
H3:  The role of independent directors on constraining 
earnings management is greater after IFRS adoption.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Mean Min Max Sd N 
ABAC 0.140 0 0.740 0.130 7394 
LEVERAGE 0.600 0.060 2.630 0.370 22713 
SIZE 21.14 9.07 41.10 1.350 22724 
ROA 0.070 -0.230 0.530 0.110 22714 
GROWTH 3.730 -6.300 28.84 4.120 19078 
IFRS 0.600 0 1 0.490 26360 
Bsize 10 5 20 2.300 18204 
BInd 4 1 10 0.870 18204 
Big4 0.040 0 1 0.190 28996 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data collection 
 
This research uses Chinese listed firms from the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock exchanges. The data comes from the China Centre 
for Economics Research (CCER) database and from the 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) which was created by 
the GTA Information Technology Company. The observation period 
ranges from 2003 to 2013 but excludes 2007. The reason for 
omitting 2007 is that this was the first year in which the IFRS was 
adopted and it could be biased and not reflects the real situation. 
The observation period was divided into two subperiods. The first is 
the pre-IFRS period of 2003 to 2006. The second group is the post-
IFRS of 2008 to 2013. The research does not include financial firms 
because of the differences in accounting measurements between 
these firms and those of other industries. Since the empirical 
analyses require particular test variables to enable the calculation, 
the sample only includes those firms with valid data.  
Measurement and empirical model 
 
This research develops various models to segregate the total 
accruals into two groups: nondiscretionary and discretionary. The 
Jones (1991) model is used to calculate the absolute value of the 
abnormal accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) modifies the Jones model 
to measure the level of earnings management with a regression. 
The firms’   E and net value revenue are the ones that this model 
uses to estimate the normal accruals in the same industry. The 
amount of accruals below or above the standard accruals 
represents the firms’ abnormal accruals that this regression 
generates as residuals. The degree to which the normal accruals 
depart from the total accruals represents the level of earnings 
management which is measured as the absolute value of the 
residual. The low earnings quality is indicated by the high absolute 
value of the abnormal accruals. 
 
 
 
 
TACC represents the total accruals for firm (i) in year (t); 
ASSETSit_1 represents the total assets for firm (i) in period t_1; 
∆REVit includes the revenues in period t minus the revenues in 
period t_1; ∆RECit includes the period t receivables minus the 
period t_1 receivables for firm I; PPEit represents the gross 
property, plant, and equipment of firm i in period t; and Eit is the 
firm’s error term i in period t. 
An OLS estimation evaluates whether the extent of earnings 
management is lower after IFRS adoption: 
 
 
 
ABAC represents the absolute value of the abnormal accruals, 
while SIZE signifies the natural logarithm total assets. ROA signifies 
the return on assets ratio (control variable). LEVERAGE represents 
the total debt divided by total assets (control variable). GROWTH 
signifies the share price divided by the book value per share 
(control variable). The IFRS represents a dummy variable that 
equals one if the financial statement is prepared under IFRS, and 
zero otherwise. The total number of board members is represented 
by Bsize, while BInd signifies board independence and equals the 
ratio of the number of directors on the board to the number of 
outside directors. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table  1   summarises   the  descriptive  statistics  for  the 
whole sample. The mean of the absolute values of the 
abnormal accruals is 0.140, while the minimum and 
maximum values of ABAC are 0.740 and 0. The mean 
size of the firms is 21.14. The mean for leverage is 0.600 
with a maximum value of 2.630. Big 4 audit firms handle 
only 4% of the sample firms, which is unlike the audit 
market in the more developed capital markets. Most of 
the constant control variables have an approximately 
symmetric distribution. 
 
 
Univariate analysis 
 
The matrix of Pearson correlations is shown in Table 2. 
This matrix provides the correlations among the 
coefficients for the variables in the regression model. The 
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Table 2. Correlation person matrix. 
  
Correlation ABAC LEVERAGE SIZE ROA GROWTH IFRS Bsize BInd Big4 
ABAC 1 
        
LEVERAGE 0.282*** 1 
       
SIZE -0.089*** 0.050*** 1 
      
ROA 0.030*** 0.034*** -0.318*** 1 
     
GROWTH 0.023** -0.004 -0.205*** 0.110*** 1 
    
IFRS -0.020* -0.058*** 0.086*** 0.175*** 0.139*** 1 
   
Bsize -0.026* -0.123*** 0.012* 0.396*** 0.190*** 0.331*** 1 
  
Bind -0.031*** -0.006 -0.023*** 0.736*** 0.037*** 0.191*** 0.559*** 1 
 
Big4 -0.007 0.012* 0.301*** -0.01 -0.043*** 0.005 -0.002 0.036*** 1 
 
 
 
Table 3. VIF Collinearity test. 
 
Variable TF VIF 
ABAC 0.448 1.612 
LEVERAGE 0.767 1.257 
SIZE 0.706 1.295 
ROA 0.757 1.435 
GROWTH 0.644 1.368 
IFRS 0.779 1.355 
Bsize 0.633 1.368 
BInd 0.449 1.747 
Big4 0.751 1.262 
ABAC 0.382 1.367 
LEVERAGE 0.454 1.369 
SIZE 0.658 1.855 
 
The sample is based on data from 2003 to 2013 but excludes 2007. 
 
 
 
independent variables of the model correlate with the 
absolute value of the abnormal accruals. Consequently, 
the IFRS users and the absolute value of the abnormal 
accruals have a significantly negative association. As 
such, this association indicates that the firms which use 
the IFRS have a lower absolute value of abnormal 
accruals that result in high quality accruals. 
Consequently, there is a significantly negative correlation 
between the absolute value of the abnormal accruals and 
the period of post-IFRS. According to Ohlson (1995) and 
Dechow et al. (1995), higher quality accruals are related 
to a lower absolute value for the abnormal accruals. 
Another indication is that the firms that have adopted 
IFRS have a highly significant association if they are 
larger. Moreover, a positive correlation exists between 
the larger size and the IFRS in terms of firms that use it. 
Moreover, this correlation exists for a lower debt level, 
lower return on assets ratio and lower growth. Field 
 2009) confirms that “correlation coefficients measure the 
strength of association or relationship between two 
variables”. The strength of the correlation is between plus 
and minus one. The matrix  of  Pearson  correlations  can 
be used to not only detect multicollinearity between 
variables but also to detect the strength of the relations 
between variables. This study tests for multicollinearity by 
finding the values of the variance inflation factors for the 
independent variables as indicated in Table 3. The 
occurrence of multicollinearity in a given model is not only 
the factor of a tolerance nearer to zero but also VIF 
values larger than 10. The results indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in the regression in the 
model.  
 
 
Multivariate analysis 
 
According to Dechow et al. (1995), the absolute values of 
the abnormal accruals are used to estimate the model 
with the results that are shown in Table 4. Based on the 
study’s hypothesis, lower earnings management should 
exist after the IFRS is adopted in China. However, there 
is a significant rise in earnings management as indicated 
in Table 4 (p-value 0.0650) which contradicts the 
hypothesis. According to Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005), this  result  could be because of numerous issues  
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Table 4. OLS models. 
 
Variable 
2003-2006  2008-2013  Full Model 
Coefficients t P  Coefficients t p  Coefficients t p 
IFRS - - -  - - -  0.007* (1.85) 0.065 
SIZE -0.005 (-1.39) 0.166  -0.020*** (-12.14) 0.000  -0.017*** (-11.90) 0.000 
ROA -0.000 (-0.01) 0.994  0.054** (2.16) 0.031  0.051** (2.45) 0.014 
GROWTH -0.001 (-0.46) 0.391  0.000 (0.06) 0.950  -0.000 (-0.03) 0.978 
LEVERAGE 0.112*** (12.14) 0.000  0.135*** (23.39) 0.000  0.126*** (25.94) 0.000 
Bsize -0.000 (-0.86) 0.381  0.000 (0.34) 0.510  0.000 (0.64) 0.370 
BInd -0.000 (-0.36) 0.421  -0.028*** (8.46) 0.000  -0.048** (8.53) 0.006 
Big4 0.014 (1.24) 0.217  0.014** (1.98) 0.048  0.015*** (2.61) 0.009 
Constant 0.182** (2.22) 0.027  0.462*** (9.67) 0.000  0.431*** (11.99) 0.000 
Industry Controlled - -  Controlled - -  Controlled - - 
Observations 1,794 - -  4,670 - -  6,464 - - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 - -  0.143 - -  0.128 - - 
F 8.756 - -  32.21 - -  37.34 - - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
which limit the success of adopting the IFRS. And the 
major worry involves the greater utilisation of fair value 
accounting when adopting the IFRS. They argue that 
there is liquidity in capital markets as in the emerging 
markets that allows managers to greatly affect the quoted 
prices (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). 
Hypothesis one is rejected because managers have a 
high probability of influencing the estimation through their 
choice of preferred parameters and models as well as 
estimating fair values through models of valuation which 
lead to noisy results. Therefore, as the results of this 
study show, earnings management was not controlled 
through the firms who adopted the IFRS. In general, 
these results align with several studies including Hail et 
al. (2010) and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and 
who argue that those countries without appropriate 
institutional infrastructures and suitable capital market 
paradigms do not effectively implement IFRS enough to 
support reporting rules. Yuanhui et al. (2014) argue that 
firms that follow cost leadership strategy are more likely 
to have a higher level of real earnings management. 
These results have been criticized by Kim et al. (2013) for 
two reasons. First, the differentiation between companies 
adopting IFRS in full of partial adopters is not easy. 
Second, there is a general tendency to improve the 
quality of reports which makes impossible to exclude the 
possibility that companies applying local standards, 
improve the quality of their reports. Table 4 illustrates the 
results from using the board’s independence and size. It 
shows that the coefficient for Bsize is not significant. 
Consequently, the earnings management does not have 
a significant association with this factor, and there is no 
differential effect between pre- and post-IFRS. The 
reason is that as the board size does not have a strong 
effect on  controlling  managers  in  China.  On  the  other 
hand, after the IFRS adoption, the coefficient is 
significant and positive for role of actors on managers.   
Separate models are used for pre-and post-IFRS. The 
aim is to know whether each period had a significantly 
different coefficient for the test variables of Bind and 
Bsize. The results on these variables are consistent with 
earlier studies regarding earnings management, and they 
indicate that the adjusted R-square values of both models 
are 9.8% for the pre-IFRS model and 14.3% for the post-
IFRS regression. There is no significant coefficient for 
BInd in the pre-IFRS model which shows that the 
earnings management prior to the IFRS adoption was not 
affected by high numbers of independent directors. 
However, a larger coefficient is observed in the post-
IFRS period. Using a t-test, the two coefficients 
statistically differ at the 1% level. The third hypothesis of 
this study is validated through these results in which after 
IFRS adoption, independent directors could efficiently 
constrain earnings management. In general, the third 
hypothesis is supported through the results in Table 4 as 
the results show that after IFRS adoption, the earnings 
management can be effectively decreased through board 
independence; the same results do not prove the second 
hypothesis which theorises that the earnings 
management would be affected by the board size after 
IFRS adoption. 
 
 
Test of robustness 
 
This study applies a robustness test to see whether the 
earlier studies are robust. Using the model of Kasznik 
(1999), the results in Table 5 for the absolute value of the 
abnormal accrual estimation are checked for robustness. 
The following model comes from Kasznik (1999). 
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Table 5. OLS model using interaction variables. 
 
Variable Coefficient t p 
IFRS 0.008* (1.92) 0.041 
SIZE -0.016*** (-10.68) 0.000 
ROA 0.037* (1.76) 0.078 
GROWTH 0.000 (0.40) 0.691 
LEVERAGE 0.124*** (25.12) 0.000 
Big4 0.017*** (2.80) 0.005 
Bsize 0.000 (0.64) 0.370 
BInd -0.048** (8.53) 0.006 
IFRS*Bsize 0.000 (0.42) 0.730 
IFRS*BInd -0.016* (2.67) 0.016 
Constant 0.391*** (10.75) 0.000 
Industry Controlled - - 
Observations 6,464 - - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 - - 
F 34.49 - - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
The results from the robustness test are in accordance 
with the regression model that was previously performed. 
Thus, the results remain the same. 
 
 
Further, two additional regression models are used on 
the entire sample (pre- and post-IFRS) by using 
interaction variables to validate the results. The models 
are defined as follows: 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, β10 is statistically significant and 
negative in the regression. The interaction terms capture 
the impact of board independence on the discretionary 
accruals for the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS 
introduction period. Thus, the results show that BInd 
becomes more influential in affecting discretionary 
accruals for the post-IFRS years, which means that 
increasing the number of independent directors 
decreases the absolute value of the discretionary 
accruals. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has evaluated the effects of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management by considering the role of 
board size and board independence for a sample of listed 
firms in China from 2003 to 2013. The sample generates 
a total of 6,464 observations for a four-year period before 
IFRS adoption and for a six-year period after the 
adoption. This study tests whether the level of earnings 
management is significantly lower after the adoption of 
the IFRS and explores the roles of  the  board’s  size  and 
independence on earning management in the two 
periods. The empirical results indicate that IFRS adoption 
increased the earnings management in China and there 
was no association between earnings management and 
board size before and after the adoption of the IFRS, 
however, increasing the number of independent directors 
decreases earnings management after IFRS adoption. 
The study concludes that just focusing on accounting 
standards alone is misleading and incomplete. It 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the 
effect of IFRS on earning management in developing 
economies. Currently, several developing economies and 
countries have either adopted the IFRS or have mostly 
converged with it, but the literature provides little 
evidence on its impact in a developing economy. This 
study adds to the literature that financial reporting quality 
is shaped not only by financial reporting standards, but 
also reporting incentives, corporate governance and 
institutional factors. Listed firms in China do not respond 
to reporting incentives due to the lack of effective 
governance systems, and therefore cannot monitor or 
provide strong investor protection by adopting superior 
quality  accounting   standards.  Furthermore,   the   IFRS  
 
 
 
 
offers greater flexibility that creates additional 
opportunities for managing earnings in the Chinese firms. 
The evidence provided by this study might be quite 
interesting to investors and regulators since China has 
become significant in the global economy. Still, the 
evidence is also important not only for emerging 
countries with similar institutional characteristics and 
capital markets but also to local standard setters. This 
study recommends additional future research to be 
carried out in other environments in order to reveal the 
effect of adopting IFRS more completely. Moreover, 
future studies can similarly consider other attributes of 
accounting quality such as timeliness, persistence, 
comparability, predictability and earnings conservatism 
while examining the role of board characteristics.   
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